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SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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SURVEY

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2 JANUARY 1970
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SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

(19 DECEMBER 1969 - 1 JANUARY 1970)

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

OPPONENTS TO GDR DRAFT TREATY ON RELATIONS WITH BONN SCORED

East German comment and reportage lauds the GDR's draft treaty on the establishment of relations "on a basis of equality" between East Germany and the Federal Republic, characterizing it as an important initiative worthy of serious consideration but foreseeing opposition from West German forces unwilling to accept "realities." The draft treaty, submitted to the West German authorities on 18 December under a covering letter from Ulbricht, was released textually by GDR media on the 21st.*

Typical of the comment is an article in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 28th which says that in the view of many West Germans "the endeavors of the Springer press and the CDU/CSU opposition to torpedo concrete and early negotiations on the basis of the GDR proposals are an indication of the intention to hold the Brandt/Scheel Government on the course of the cold war." The commentary adds that the feeling prevails in the FRG that the attitude of the government toward the GDR proposals is "a touchstone for the seriousness of the new course in Willy Brandt's foreign policy." An East Berlin radio commentary on the 29th, which observes that "anyone who wants to act realistically can do nothing but accept this draft treaty," also takes the Springer press and the CDU/CSU to task. It says that these forces have opened an attack which "centers on the imperative demand to maintain Bonn's arrogant claim to sole representation and not to recognize the results of World War II."

Beginning on the 27th, a spate of East German comment broaches the question of whether the 1955 Paris treaties prohibit the normalization of relations between the two German states. A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article on that day, summarized by ADN, says that when the draft treaty was submitted, "the West German side" argued against the proposal by alleging that the establishment of equal relations under international law is not possible because the Paris accords do not permit it. The article, which states that the treaties "do not refer to this point directly," observes that the Bonn government will have to determine whether the accords do "in fact forbid the

* For a review of the treaty as well as initial East German and Soviet comment, see the FBIS TRENDS for 24 December 1969, pages 23-24.

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establishment of relations with the GDR and what is to be done." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 30th, noting that "West German circles" have viewed the Paris treaties' restrictions on the FRG's policies as a "welcome obstacle to accepting the treaty offered by the GDR," advises Bonn "not to get hooked" on dogmas from the Adenauer era "but to assure itself of the freedom of maneuver needed for a realistic policy in the present situation." An East Berlin domestic television commentary on the 30th assails "reactionary forces" for their pressing of the Paris treaties as an obstacle to normal relations. It says that Bonn's Basic Law does not prohibit recognition of the GDR and "as for the reservations of the Western powers, DER SPIEGEL wrote quite appropriately yesterday that the friendly Western powers could renounce their rights if Bonn so desires."

MOSCOW COMMENT

Moscow, which has maintained a virtual silence on its own recent talks with the FRG regarding a nonuse-of-force agreement,* has continued to hail the GDR initiative, the most authoritative comment to date coming in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA articles on the 28th. Writing in PRAVDA, commentator Mikhaylov levels a pro forma attack against the "leaders of the right wing of the CDU/CSU grouping" and at the same time chides the Bonn government for its "preference to delay its final decision in connection with the peaceloving initiative undertaken by the GDR." When this decision is ultimately made, Mikhaylov concludes, an appraisal can be made "of the entire essence of the foreign political course of the Brandt Government by the other European states and the continent's entire peaceloving public." IZVESTIYA commentator Sibirtsev, in a rundown of various opposition forces to the draft treaty, says that "an official government spokesman has stated publicly that Bonn is not prepared to sign such a treaty." Sibirtsev

* Moscow's only acknowledgment of the talks appears in a 25 December commentary in Mandarin reacting to Chinese charges of a "sellout" of the GDR. The commentary says that "negotiation between the Soviet Union and the FRG in Moscow was a routine thing following the birth of the new administration in Bonn. But NCNA has interpreted the talks as Moscow's sinister collusion with West German militarists." For a discussion of Peking's charges and the Soviet response, see the Sino-Soviet section of the FBIS TRENDS for 31 December 1969, pages 15-18.

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says that Bonn has now been given the chance to support with deeds its professed desire for good relations with the GDR and the other socialist countries, concluding that "the future will show whether the Federal Republic avails itself of this opportunity."

Warsaw Backs GDR Proposal, States Readiness to Talk With FRG

Warsaw, itself striving to open negotiations with Bonn, promptly endorses the GDR proposal. Immediately after the GDR had delivered the draft treaty and the Ulbricht letter a 19 December Warsaw PAP item says approvingly that it is a link in a series of GDR initiatives aimed at normalizing relations. An editorial in GLOS PRACY on the 23d says in effect that the nature of Bonn's response will serve as a yardstick to show how far the "political evolution" in West Germany has progressed. Observing that there have been "changes in West German policy toward greater realism" since the Brandt/Scheel government came into power, the editorial concludes that "it is still impossible to answer the question of how far these changes go." A 26 December PAP commentary briefly alludes to the Ulbricht proposal, stating that it as well as Polish initiatives toward the FRG "are in fact an expression of the same conviction" that European security should be based on the recognition of the existing territorial and political status quo, on the recognition of the fact that equal international relations between the GDR and other states are a necessary condition for the process of reducing European tensions.

POLISH NOTE TO FRG

Premier Cyrankiewicz, in a speech at the closing session of the Sejm on 22 December, reviewed at some length the current state of Polish-West German relations and revealed that a note on a possible "exchange of views" with the FRG would be delivered to Bonn later in the day. The text of the note--which according to Cyrankiewicz was a response to a 24 November West German note*--has not been released by Warsaw. But judging by the Cyrankiewicz speech as well as followup comment, the note incorporates the demand for recognition by the FRG of the Oder-Neisse border. In his remarks before the Sejm, the Polish Premier recalled PZPR First Secretary

* A PAP communique on 25 November broadcast in the Warsaw domestic service briefly reported that the West German ambassador that day handed a note to Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz which contained "an offer of political talks." The contents of the note were not publicized.

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Gomulka's 17 May 1969 speech in which he declared Poland's readiness to conclude a treaty with the FRG recognizing that frontier, and asserted that FRG recognition of the Oder-Neisse line "as final and inviolable constitutes the starting point for opening the process of normalization of relations" between Poland and the FRG. A 24 December TRYBUNA LUDU commentary on the Cyrankiewicz speech calls recognition of the frontier a "point of departure" for normalization of relations, concluding that the new Bonn government "cannot ignore the unbreakable principles of our foreign policy." And the PAP commentary of the 26th, cited above, also calls recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier a "point of departure." It says that other questions such as cultural exchanges and the development of tourism "will be possible only when the West German side shows full realism and understanding for the Polish stand on the basic, preliminary issue." But it promptly adds that "we draw a line of distinction between political and economic talks. . . . The conception of treating trade exchange as a process in itself, based not on political conditions but on mutual economic advantages, is a cornerstone of the foreign policy of Poland and of other socialist states."

A PAP report on the 27th of Chancellor Brandt's interview with a Cologne paper says that he indicated the FRG was "fully aware that the problem of European frontiers, and that of the Oder-Neisse frontier in particular, could not be excluded from talks between West Germany and Poland."

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LATIN AMERICA

CUBAN MEDIA PUBLICIZE BRAZILIAN REVOLUTIONARIES' VIEWS

Since the 30 September arrival in Havana of 13 Brazilian revolutionaries who had been released from prison in exchange for the freedom of kidnaped U.S. Ambassador Elbrick, Havana media have given substantial play to statements by the former prisoners and other exiled revolutionaries, uniformly urging the launching of an armed struggle as the sole means of ridding Brazil of a dictatorial regime and replacing it with a revolutionary one. These statements, which often argue that rural guerrilla warfare is the key method of struggle to be pursued and that Brazil must become one of the "many Vietnams" which Che Guevara envisaged, are being publicized at a time when Cuban media--heavily preoccupied with the national effort to produce 10 million tons of sugar--are devoting relatively little attention to the question of armed struggle in Latin America.

The death in November of Brazilian revolutionary leader Carlos Marighela, a former Brazilian Communist Party leader and founder of the National Liberating Action (ALN) which was implicated in the ambassador's abduction, produced a spate of comment and reportage arguing that his death enhanced rather than dampened the prospects of armed struggle. For more than a month after Marighela's demise, Havana media carried documents allegedly issued by him promoting the cause of guerrilla warfare, and they continue to publicize statements holding Marighela up as an example to his successors.

Arriving in Havana just three weeks after the Cuban-backed Bolivian guerrilla movement had suffered a serious reverse with the death of Guido "Inti" Peredo, successor to Che Guevara as the chief of the Bolivian Army of National Liberation, the Brazilian revolutionaries were given a warm welcome, with Castro himself greeting them at the airport. During the airport meeting, Castro lauded the development of the Brazilian revolutionary movement:

We see things from a distance, but it is surprising to see the speed with which the Brazilian revolutionary movement has been advancing and the degree of development it has reached. You can see the people have a lot of will power and good organization. Action is spreading.

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And although Cuban media had given Ambassador Elbrick's kidnaping scant coverage when it occurred,* Castro characterized it as a "sensational" act which was "a humiliation, a smashing blow to imperialism and its lackeys in Brazil." Implying agreement with a New York TIMES' comparison of the situation in Brazil to that prevailing in Cuba on the eve of Batista's fall, Castro declared that the Brazilian military were faced with a prerevolutionary situation, having "reached the end of their rope." But he added the caveat: "It is possible that the revolutionaries are not yet strong enough, but the reactionaries have no way out."

In their interviews with Havana media since their arrival in Cuba, the ex-prisoners have stressed their agreement with Guevara's theories on revolutionary struggle. In an interview on a 29 October Radio Havana broadcast beamed to Brazil, one of their number, former student leader Luis Travassos, expressed the view that Cubans were willing to assist the Brazilian revolutionary struggle. "On all our visits we can see evidence," Travassos stated, "that the Cuban people have deep convictions about the struggle in Brazil and are really willing to make every possible contribution to the Brazilian people, including giving up their own lives for the general cause of Latin America."

That Brazil is to be one of the Latin American "Vietnams" envisaged by Guevara has been repeatedly emphasized by the exiles. In a 16 October interview with 12 of them carried by Havana TV and radio, one participant promised to "see to it that Brazil becomes one of Major Guevara's Vietnams," adding that "we may participate in the second, in the third, and in all Vietnams of Latin America." Noting that Brazilian revolutionaries were directing their efforts toward "beginning rural guerrilla warfare," he castigated those who "today dare to preach reforms and peaceful measures"--an apparent reference to the orthodox Brazilian Communist Party (PCB)--as "traitors" to the revolution. Similar views were elaborated by another participant, who emphasized that the Brazilian revolution would be part of a struggle having "hemispheric" proportions, in accordance with the thesis of the immortal Che:

The struggle of the Brazilian people in relation to that of the other peoples of Latin America will be

* For a discussion of Cuban reaction to Ambassador Elbrick's abduction and later release, see the FBIS SURVEY of 11 September 1969, pages 27-30.

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carried out in accordance with the ideas of Major Che Guevara by transforming our struggle into a hemispheric struggle This is because the counterrevolutionary strategy of U.S. imperialism makes it necessary.

He stressed the pivotal importance of Brazil for the continental revolution and indicated that the participation of other Latin American revolutionaries would be required in the Brazilian struggle:

. . . our commitment is not to respect any of Brazil's 10 borders in South America Our Cuban comrades can well imagine what the creation of a Vietnam in Brazil would mean Cuba, which is a great nation, has a great leader, but unfortunately Cuba is an island in the Antilles. However, imagine what would happen in Brazil with so many neighbors, and in what situation the imperialists would find themselves.

Asserting that this year "is the year of rural guerrilla warfare in Brazil," he said that "the contribution" of other Latin American revolutionaries in the Brazilian armed struggle was "a necessity."

PRAISE OF MARIGHELA

Almost two months after the death of Carlos Marighela, Havana media continue to praise him and his teachings. Marighela, an exponent of Cuban guerrilla warfare theses, had been expelled from the PCB following his attendance at the 1967 Latin American Solidarity Organization conference in Havana which the party had boycotted. After his death at the hands of Brazilian security forces in November--as after the death of Guevara, Peredo, and other Latin American revolutionaries--Havana contended that while this was a grievous blow to Brazilian revolutionaries, his example would live on and spur them to greater feats.

In a typical example of continuing Cuban attention to Marighela, Havana Radio and the Cuban party organ GRANMA on 30 December carried an interview with Joaquim Camara Ferreira, identified as one of the leaders of the ALN. Camara Ferreira declared that "by his example, by his personal participation in many revolutionary actions," Marighela brought over "tens of thousands of Brazilians"

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to the "path of armed strife." Calling Marighela's death a "hard blow" which "in no way" meant the end of the revolutionary struggle, Camara Ferreira said that he had left a legacy of "clear ideas and a strong organization." He added that the ALN would be strengthened, that urban guerrilla actions would be continued, and that "the decisive move" of taking "the fighting to the hills" would be accomplished. In connection with the latter, Camara Ferreira concluded that without rural actions "the urban struggle has no future," and that once the rural conflict began "the cities will be completely drawn to the struggle."

As if to demonstrate the validity of its contention that Marighela's passing did not mean the end of the armed struggle, a 5 December Radio Havana commentary cited ALN operations since his death, including robberies "designed to gather funds to buy arms for the revolutionary organizations." PRENSA LATINA the same day carried a communique issued by six ALN members in Havana declaring that in spite of Marighela's death the ALN "will remain active and grow with greater vigor." It argued that just as Che's death revealed to "millions of Latin Americans" the need for armed struggle, "the blood of Marighela will encourage millions of Brazilians to take up arms, following the brilliant example of the Cuban revolution and the just revolutionary war of the people of Vietnam." On 4 December Radio Havana announced a series of programs featuring statements and documents issued by Marighela, and on the 6th it broadcast a recorded statement by Marighela describing the methodology to be employed in launching rural guerrilla warfare in Brazil.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

TOPIC IN BRIEF

PLAF YEAR-END COMMUNIQUE

Military developments in South Vietnam during 1969 are reviewed in a year-end "special" PLAF command communique, dated 31 December and broadcast that day by Liberation Radio. This is the 17th special communique since the 1968 Tet offensive and the sixth in 1969. The 16th special PLAF command communique, released on 22 September, reviewed action during August and early September.

The year-end communique claims that 1969 was a year of "our continuous, accelerated and persistent offensive," and says this is of "special significance." And it echoes other propaganda in predicting that the Vietnamization policy will not succeed. Declaring that the "great victories" during the year dealt a "very painful blow" to the Vietnamization scheme, it alleges that the U.S. attempt to reduce its casualties was frustrated, that they were in fact higher during 1969 than in 1968, and that U.S. losses in war materiel increased by one and a half to two times. It claims that the communists have checked the accelerated pacification plan "which the U.S. aggressors consider the backbone of the Vietnamization scheme."

The communique says that "according to incomplete statistics" 645,000 allied troops, including 235,000 U.S. and "satellite" troops, were killed, wounded, or captured, and that the communists destroyed 6,400 aircraft, 19,000 military vehicles, 1,700 combat vessels, and burned 700 ammunition, gas, and oil depots. To document its allegation that the casualty figure increased in 1969, the communique recalls the claims that in 1968 casualties numbered 630,000, including 230,000 U.S. and "satellite" troops.*

The communique makes the usual claim of "all-round" military, political, and diplomatic "victories," calling "the birth of the PRG" an "extremely important" political event and observing that the PRG has gained widespread international recognition. It says that the NFLSV's 10-point overall solution "has further illuminated the justice of

* These claims--which were also described as "incomplete statistics"--were included in the 11th special PLAF command communique dated 22 December 1968.

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our people's struggle," but, despite the reference to diplomatic victories, it does not mention the Paris talks or a negotiated settlement. Noting the grief over Ho Chi Minh's death, it says that the entire country is determined to implement his will by launching an emulation movement "to kill the enemy."

In connection with the attack on the Vietnamization plan, the communique not only points to the weakness and isolation of the Saigon "puppet administration," but says that the 1969 communist victories have "shaken the U.S. aggressors' rear area." It says that the "progressive" Americans' antiwar movement has developed "on a scale exceptionally large in U.S. history" despite President Nixon's "crafty tricks" to deceive public opinion. It alleges that the Nixon Administration is isolated "in the United States and in the world," and it adds that the "brilliant" 1969 victories have demonstrated clearly that "our line of general offensive and simultaneous uprising is completely correct." Declaring that the victories have encouraged "our troops and people to believe firmly in final victory," it observes that as Ho said "the struggle will surely achieve complete victory, although it must endure many more hardships and sacrifices."*

The communique goes on in a rather subdued tone to declare that "our people's victory is drawing nearer than ever before," prefacing this with the warning that although "U.S.-puppet defeat" is "obvious," the struggle "will continue encountering many difficulties and complexities." As if to bolster predictions of victory, the communique concludes:

We defeated the U.S. imperialists when they escalated the war using the greatest number of U.S. troops and when the war was Americanized to a high degree. Now stubborn and perfidious as they are, they are forced to seek ways to deescalate the war. They have switched to strategic defense and must continue withdrawing U.S. troops. Their crime-studded** Vietnamization plan is being seriously shaken and will certainly be foiled. All this affirms all the more eloquently that our victory is definite.

* This negative note was absent from the 11th special PLAF command communique which reviewed developments in 1968. Last year's communique was much longer and more detailed in describing communist achievements and allied problems. It was enthusiastic in its superlative praise, calling the year "a magnificent epic" and "extremely great." It praised the North for its achievements and was extensive in its praise of the NFLSV.

** The communique curiously does not go into allied "crimes," even though this has been a major theme in other propaganda.

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COMMUNIST CHINA

JOINT EDITORIAL FOR NEW YEAR'S OFFERS "NEW" MAO QUOTATIONS

For the first time since the onset of the cultural revolution, the annual New Year's Day editorial of PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY was devoted chiefly to international rather than domestic topics. It assailed both the United States and the USSR--making the first direct attack on Brezhnev since the Sino-Soviet negotiations opened--but at the same time reaffirmed the CPR's desire "to develop diplomatic relations with all countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence."

On the domestic front, the editorial's guidance for the forthcoming decade was broadly generalized, with repetition of such standardized exhortations as "fulfill still better and faster the fighting tasks set forth by the Ninth Party Congress." There were calls for continued ideological revolution in the form of criticism of Liu Shao-chi's policies and for continued party consolidation and building. In the economic area the people were warned to prepare for "hard struggle" and to work on the basis of "self-reliance." Avoiding any mention of grandiose goals for the 1970's, the editorial sounded the cautionary reminder that "leeway" must be allowed and that further investigation and study must be undertaken in the field of economic policy.

The "war preparations" theme was sounded prominently, although the editorial seemed to reflect less rather than more concern regarding the risk of hostilities in the near term. The United States and "Soviet revisionist social imperialism" were portrayed as acutely troubled, nearing their inevitable collapse. Nonetheless, the editorial warned, imperialism means war, and "we must be fully prepared both ideologically and materially." The PLA was advised to "enhance its fighting capabilities," but primary emphasis was placed on the army's role in giving prominence to politics and in carrying out the revolutionary program of "three supports and two militaries."

A well-known war-preparedness slogan, introduced on 16 September 1969 as one of 29 National Day slogans, is now attributed to Mao by the editorial: "People of the world, unite and oppose any war of aggression launched by imperialism or social-imperialism, especially one in which atom bombs are used as weapons! If such a war breaks

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out, the people of the world should use revolutionary war to eliminate the war of aggression, and preparations should be made right now!" The editorial also attributes two phrases regarding work procedures to Mao, alleging that he enunciated them at the Ninth Congress: "It is necessary to grasp typical cases well." "As regards the entire work it is necessary first to grasp well one-third of it." The policies embodied in these apothegms, and the apothegms themselves, have been widely publicized in CPR media in recent weeks.

These quotations thus do not constitute new "recent instructions from the Chairman" in the cultural-revolution style, of which the last were issued on 1 August 1969.. Perhaps one significant aspect is that the Chinese audience has now been informed that Mao said something for the record as recently as last September; previously, the audience had known only that the last official words were uttered sometime prior to 1 August.

Provincial Comment Stresses Economic Effort for New Year

Provincial editorials and articles broadcast by the local radios have been sounding most of the themes of the central editorial, but with greater stress on economic affairs. The major point seems to be that, while great progress has been made, continued sacrifice and struggle are mandatory.

Most provinces are claiming a good grain harvest for the past year, while making often extravagant-sounding claims for the program of building an industrial network in support of agriculture. Fertilizer seems to remain the principle concern, with numerous reports of new small fertilizer factories and of progress in pig-breeding, a prime source of natural fertilizer. Some deviations from the general bright picture have been noted: Kiangsu radio on the 25th criticized tendencies to plant economic crops rather than grain, and a CHEKIANG DAILY editorial on 24 December noted that some areas had failed to reach goals set by the "national program for the development of agriculture," which it indicated are regarded as minimums. The editorial stated that the goal of 1,000 catties of grain per mou was attainable in the next three to five years.

Short-term production goals were also indicated for Anhwei, in a Hofei broadcast illustrating Mao's dictum on "grasping one-third first." An Anhwei revolutionary committee decision on 16 December noted that northern Anhwei was the current target and that "the backward communes and production brigades in northern Anhwei can be transformed within three to four years."

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Attention to Party Rebuilding Campaign Is Slight

The central New Year's editorial paid only passing attention to the party rebuilding campaign. Stressing the ideological aspect of the rebuilding, it stated that "we must give first place to the ideological consolidation of the party" and that new members must be educated in the theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought. It also declared that "we must consolidate and perfect the revolutionary committees at various levels" while at the same time "leading organs at the various levels" must work to strengthen the "centralized leadership of the party."

In keeping with this lack of specificity, the editorial did not mention the new CCP committee at the Hsinhua printing plant, announced on 15 December by NCNA as a model for emulation. The NCNA report, the first in central media on a new CCP committee since the Ninth Party Congress, spelled out the supremacy of the new party committee over the plant's established revolutionary committee. There has in general been little follow-up attention to the Hsinhua model in CPR media.

On 16 December Radio Peking did commend, in vague terms, "the party organization of the Shengyang municipal people's paper mill" as a "vanguard organization which is more united, purified, and vigorous, and stronger than ever." The broadcast article stated that in building the party ideological consolidation should be achieved first and then used to advance organizational consolidation. There was no mention of the mill's revolutionary committee nor its relationship to the party organization.

Provincial radios continue to carry very occasional reports on party rebuilding activity. On 30 December Changsha radio claimed that "new party committees have been victoriously set up one after the other" in numerous counties, communes, factories, mines, offices and schools in Hunan. The broadcast said that "these new party committees are the results of the active and painstaking party rectification and building" carried out by "party organizations and revolutionary committees at all levels" in Hunan. Ideological rectification was completed first so that party members would "voluntarily seek the opinions of the masses and humbly accept the assistance of the masses." The report noted that the Changte county CCP committee--announced on 2 December by Changsha radio as "the first new county CCP committee to be established in Hunan"--has, since its establishment, "placed the creative study and application of Mao Tsetung thought before every other task."

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The report also claimed that the party committee of the Hsiangtan iron and steel plant--reported on 7 November by Changsha radio--has been busy repudiating "anarchism and factionalism" and increasing production levels in the plant.

On 30 December Sian radio briefly noted that a new upsurge of Mao-study has been launched in Shensi and that "80 percent of the basic level units in Shensi have now started the work of party rectification and building."

CRG, GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT MENTIONED AGAIN

There are indications that the General Political Department of the PLA, which resurfaced in Peking last November after two years of nonvisibility, has also been reestablished organizationally in the provinces. Peking's 15 November reference was to a deputy director of the central PLA political department; a few subsequent references were monitored, but they shed no light on lower-level organization.

On 26 December, a Nanking broadcast identified Yang Kuang-li, a vice chairman of the Kiangsu PRC and chairman of the Nanking MRC, as "vice chairman of the Political Department of PLA Nanking units." Yang's emergence in this post is one indication that the political departments are being staffed by relatively high-ranking, influential officers.

The Tibet Military Region has also noted that its PLA political department is now active. Lhasa radio broadcast a directive by the regional department on 27 December which, like one issued by the central General Political Department on 29 December, calls for carrying out "support the government and cherish the people" activities during spring festival, as part of the annual campaign to improve army-people relations. In addition to these mentions of the PLA political departments, there have been numerous provincial articles on party control of the military, a matter for debate now that party control over China is being tentatively reasserted. Peking radio sounded this theme itself on 24 December in attacking "reactionary" films that fail to show "effective political work" in the army.

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On 22 December, Peking reported that the Cultural Revolution Group had during the preceding few days sponsored soirees for foreign diplomats. There had been no references in central media to the CRG since at least the Ninth Congress. During the early stages of the cultural revolution both the CRG and the General Political Department were counted among the major "radical" forces; evidence of personnel and policy is as yet insufficient to assess their current role.

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